













































































































































































(6) ∃8 !ℎ2!	3 8 	#$	%5 .	
In	particular,	(3)	becomes:	

































































On	a	set-theoretic	semantics	for	the	theory	of	types,	expressions	of	type	(!?, … , !B)	are	assigned	
sets	of	n-tuples	of	semantic	values	for	expressions	of	types	!?,		…,	!B,	respectively.	This	is	not,	however,	
the	interpretation	these	philosophers	have	in	mind;	instead,	they	take	expressions	of	type	(!?, … , !B)		to	
correspond	to	irreducible	n-ary	relations	whose	arguments	correspond	to	expressions	of	types	!?,		…,	!B,	
respectively.	On	this	picture,	propositions	are	0-ary	relations	that	correspond	to	sentences	of	type	(),	
predicates	of	type	(())	combine	with	them	to	form	sentences,	and	unary	propositional	quantifiers	are	
expressions	of	type	((())).	
These	philosophers	are	of	course	careful	to	distinguish	quantification	into	different	grammatical	
positions,	and	they	deny	that	quantification	into	predicate	or	sentence	position	–	read	externally	–	is	
quantification	over	a	domain	of	objects.	Predicates,	after	all,	do	not	refer,	they	predicate,	and,	the	
thought	goes,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	understand	quantification	into	predicate	position	as	
quantification	over	a	domain	of	objects	to	which	predicates	refer.	Likewise,	for	quantification	into	
sentence	position.	This	tradition	grants	a	representational	role	to	all	these	quantifiers	in	that	they	take	
the	world	to	be	portrayed	to	come	with	an	external	domain	in	the	form	of	a	type-theoretic	hierarchy	of	
objects	and	irreducible	relations	of	different	types.		
There’s	a	familiar	expressive	problem	for	the	position:	one	may	be	tempted	to	describe	these	
relations	as	the	semantic	values	of	expressions	of	different	categories.	But	now	one	may	object:	what	
could	these	semantic	values	be,	if	not	objects?	A	better	characterization	of	the	type-theoretic	hierarchy	
would	need	to	appeal	to	the	very	expressive	resources	we	want	to	interpret.7	But	whatever	force	the	
objection	may	have,	what	matters	for	present	purposes	is	that	the	position	opens	the	way	for	an	
externalist	reading	of	propositional	quantification	on	which	that-clauses	needn’t	be	referential.		
Hofweber	(2016)	briefly	mentions	similar	moves	in	the	vicinity	but	objects	that	it’s	not	enough	
to	say	that	these	quantifiers	are	primitive	and	that	they	cannot	be	spelled	out	other	than	in	terms	of	
themselves.	If	there	is	a	difference	between	all	these	quantifiers,	one	should	explain	what	it	is	and	how	it	
emerges	in	the	first	place.	
That’s	a	tall	order	of	course.	But	one	could	perhaps	begin	with	the	observation	is	that	there	is	an	
inferential	characterization	of	the	external	reading	of	the	existential	quantifier	of	type	(-)	on	which	it	
corresponds	to	a	restriction	on	the	internal	reading.	This	may	seem	in	tension	with	the	claim	that	a	
sentence	of	the	form	‘something	is	A’,	read	externally,	can	be	true	even	if	no	sentence	of	the	form	‘t	is	A’	
is	true	for	any	substitution	for	the	quantifier.8	However,	the	distinction	between	context-independent	
and	context-dependent	instances	of	a	quantifier	can	be	used	to	navigate	this	obstacle.	The	key	again	is	to	
make	a	distinction	between	what	it	is	for	a	context-independent	expression	to	refer	to	an	object	in	an	
external	domain	and	what	it	is	for	a	speaker	to	use	a	context-sensitive	expression	to	refer	to	it	relative	to	
a	context.	There	is,	moreover,	a	distinction	between	what	a	context-sensitive	expression	refers	to	in	
actual	contexts,	and	what	it	could	refer	to	in	a	context	–	regardless	whether	any	actual	speakers	of	the	
language	ever	find	themselves	in	it.	
The	external	reading	of	the	existential	quantifier	of	type	((-))	is	governed	by	the	rule	of	
existential	generalization,	which	is	now	implicitly	relativized	to	a	context	–	whether	actual	or	not:	
• from	‘t	is	A’,	infer	‘something	is	A’,	
where	t	is	a	referential	term	of	type	e,	which	successfully	performs	its	referential	function	relative	to	the	
context.	And	indeed,	the	external	reading	of	the	unary	existential	quantifier	appears	to	align	with	the	
corresponding	restriction	of	the	internal	reading	of	the	quantifier.	
What’s	a	referential	term?	It's	a	linguistic	expression	whose	primary	semantic	function	is	to	refer	
to	an	object.	Names	are	paradigmatic	referential	terms,	but	other	expressions	may	play	the	role	as	well.	
Moreover,	some	of	them	may	play	the	referential	role	only	relative	to	a	context	of	utterance.	A	
demonstrative,	for	example,	can	refer	to	an	object	relative	to	a	context	of	utterance.	The	appeal	to	
context	is	supposed	to	help	with	the	case	in	which	some	object	is	indeed	A	even	if	nothing	that	is	A	is	
ever	denoted	by	any	context-insensitive	referential	term	of	the	language.	For	if	something	is	indeed	A,	
then	there	could	still	be	a	context	and	a	context-sensitive	expression	that	would	denote	an	object	that	is	
A	relative	to	it.	On	this	approach,	the	external	reading	of	the	existential	quantifier	of	type	((-))	
corresponds	to	a	proper	restriction	of	its	internal	reading,	one	which	restricts	the	range	of	eligible	
substitutions	to	referential	terms	–	some	of	which	may	be	context-sensitive	–	which	successfully	
performs	their	referential	function	relative	to	a	context,	whether	actual	or	not.		
The	hope	now	would	be	to	motivate	the	external	reading	of	quantification	into	other	
grammatical	positions	as	aligned	with	a	certain	restriction	of	the	internal	reading,	one	on	which	we	
restrict	the	range	of	eligible	substitutions	for	the	quantifier	to	expressions	of	the	relevant	grammatical	
category	that	successfully	perform	their	primary	semantic	function	relative	to	a	context,	regardless	of	
whether	any	actual	speakers	ever	find	themselves	in	it.9	Sentences	are	not	referential	expressions,	but	
when	competent	speakers	encounters	one,	they	expect	it	to	come	with	a	semantic	value	conceived	here	
as	an	irreducible	0-place	relation.	10	Some	0-place	relations	may	of	course	be	expressed	by	context-
insensitive	sentences,	but	a	great	many	of	them	may	not	be.	When	we	use	a	quantifier	of	type	((()))	to	
externally	quantify	into	sentence	position,	we	restrict	the	range	of	eligible	substitutions	for	the	internal	
reading	to	context-sensitive	and	context-insensitive	expressions	of	type	()	that	successfully	perform	
their	semantic	function	relative	to	a	context,	whether	actual	or	not.	On	this	picture,	if	something	is	A	–	
where,	very	roughly,	‘something’	is	understood	as	a	quantifier	of	type	((()))	read	externally	–	there	
could	be	a	context	and	a	context-sensitive	expression	of	type	(),	which,	relative	to	that	context,	expresses	
a	0-place	relation	that	is	indeed	A.	The	external	reading	of	quantification	into	sentence	position	becomes	
a	device	for	generalization	of	successful	semantic	role	for	expressions	of	type	()	relative	to	a	context,	
whether	actual	or	not.	And	this	in	turn	amounts	to	a	generalization	over	irreducible	0-place	relations.11		
The	type-theoretic	approach	comes	with	an	alternative	account	for	the	validity	of	simple	
quantificational	inferences.	The	argument	from	(1)	to	(2)	above	is	an	instance	of	existential	
generalization	for	the	propositional	quantifier.	This	is	still	compatible	with	different	proposals	for	
regimentation.	You	may	take	the	argument	to	involve	a	sentential	operator,	‘Alice	believes	that’,	in	which	
case	that	clauses	appear	to	play	no	role	in	the	argument,	or	you	may	nevertheless	think	of	a	that	clause	
as	a	device	for	nominalization,	which	is	itself	not	a	referential	expression.12	What	is	important	for	us	is	
that	there	is	no	need	to	conceive	of	that-clauses	as	referential	expressions.	
Unlike	other	formulations	of	propositional	externalism,	this	version	makes	room	for	a	
distinction	between	the	view	of	reality	as	a	totality	of	objects	and	the	view	of	reality	as	a	totality	of	facts.	
Neither	facts	nor	propositions	more	generally	are	objects.	Nor	there	is	any	reason	to	think	that	the	
object-permitting	conception	of	ineffability	can	help	us	come	closer	to	being	able	to	express	that	a	given	
fact	is	the	case.	Whether	this	leaves	us	vulnerable	to	the	dark	vision	will	now	depend	on	what	conception	
of	ineffability	we	use	to	assess	the	ineffability	thesis.13	But	that’s	a	topic	for	another	occasion.	The	goal	
here	has	merely	been	to	explore	the	prospects	of	an	alternative	construal	of	propositional	externalism;	
whether	the	approach	places	any	constraints	on	the	ambitions	of	metaphysics	is	an	important,	though	
separate	question.14		
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1	Otherwise,	we	could	move	from	‘nothing	is	non-self-identical’	to	‘something	is	non-self-identical’.	The	
decision	is	harder	for	other	expressions.	Should,	for	example,	definite	descriptions	like	‘the	author	of	Ontology	
and	the	Ambitions	of	Metaphysics’	be	eligible	substitutions	for	t?	
	
2	Hofweber	(2016)	undertakes	this	task	in	appendix	3.7	in	p.	168.	
																																																								
																																																																																																																																																																																		
	
3	See	Hofweber	2006	for	further	discussion	of	this	problem.	
	
4	There	is	nothing	special	about	ancient	Greek	here.	There	is	no	reason	to	think	that	English	should	contain	
for	each	real	number,	a	context-independent	sentence	a	speaker	could	use	to	express	the	proposition	that	it	is	
irrational	at	any	context.	
	
5	Externalists	might	of	course	object	to	the	analysis	of	the	truth	conditions	of	(3)	in	terms	of	(7).	The	point	is	
merely	that	whatever	proposition	in	the	external	domain	is	assigned	to	the	free	variable	x	in	the	open	
sentence	‘x	is	not	expressible	in	English’	should	itself	be	an	eligible	referent	for	a	context-sensitive	expression	
in	English,	e.g.,	a	demonstrative	like	‘that’.	And,	moreover,	it	should	be	expressed	by	an	utterance	of	a	
sentence	of	the	form	‘that	is	the	case’	at	a	carefully	crafted	context.	
	
6	This	is	amply	supported	and	documented	in	chapter	8	of	Hofweber	2016.	
	
7	This	familiar	expressive	limitation	is	of	course	related	to	Frege's	infamous	concept	horse	problem.	This	and	
related	concerns	are	discussed,	for	example,	in	chapter	5	of	Williamson	2013.	
	
8	This	will	happen	whenever	the	truth	of	the	external	reading	of	the	quantifier	comes	down	to	the	existence	of	
an	object	in	the	external	domain	of	quantification	that	is	A	despite	the	fact	that	we	lack	a	term	for	it.	
	
9	Wright	(2007)	has	argued,	more	generally,	for	a	picture	of	external	quantification	as	a	device	for	
generalization	of	semantic	role.	
	
10
	For	a	broad	outline	of	the	idea	that	our	grasp	of	sentential	quantifiers	is	rooted	in	our	grasp	of	sentences,	
see	Williamson	2003	and,	more	recently,	chapter	5	of	Williamson	2013.		
	
11	These	remarks	are	not	meant	to	suggest	a	reductive	account	of	the	external	reading	of	quantification	into	
sentence	position	merely	in	terms	of	the	internal	reading.	For	they	remain	silent	as	to	what	it	is	for	something	
to	count	as	an	eligible	substitution	of	the	quantifier	relative	to	a	context,	and	what	it	takes	for	a	sentence	to	
successfully	perform	its	semantic	function.	Someone	could,	for	example,	deny	that	any	eligible	substitutions	
could	themselves	include	quantification	into	sentence	position.	So,	she	would	question	that	sentence	like	
‘something	is	true’	could	ever	be	an	eligible	substitution	for	the	internal	quantifier.	
	
12	The	first	alternative	is	advocated	by	Prior	1971	and	a	version	of	the	second	is	discussed,	for	example,	by	
Recanati	(2004).	
	
13	Though	far-fetched,	I	can	imagine	a	theorist	making	the	case	for	a	relation-permitting	conception	of	
ineffability	according	to	which	whether	a	proposition	is	ineffable	cannot	merely	be	a	matter	of	our	inability	to	
represent	a	relation	in	the	external	domain.	
	
14	For	helpful	comments	and	discussion,	thanks	to	Matti	Eklund,	Jeremy	Goodman,	and	Thomas	Hofweber.	
